

Ghana's Regional Security Policy: Costs, Benefits and Consistency

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Introduction

Since the early 1990s, Ghana's contribution to maintaining sub-regional peace and security through its participation in peacekeeping and peacemaking has increased considerably.² Ghana's involvement in resolving African and international conflicts can be traced to its intervention in the Congo crisis in the 1960s. Since then, the country has participated in several peacekeeping and peacemaking missions in countries like Lebanon, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. In all these missions, Ghana's peacekeepers have played a significant role in alleviating immediate human suffering, and its mediators have helped in creating the basis for the resolution of conflicts in Africa such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone. By committing human and financial resources to these missions, the country's international image has been enhanced.

As a member state of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), Ghana is committed to the various decisions, resolutions and protocols that guide these regional mechanisms with specific reference to peacekeeping.³ The country is thus obligated to participate actively in decisions and activities of these organisations.

Following the initial intervention in Congo in 1960, Ghana has been involved in more complex peacekeeping operations beginning with the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts in the early 1990s. In Liberia, Ghana was among the five leading member states of ECOWAS which deployed troops before the UN Security Council belatedly sanctioned it. On 30 May 1990, a consultative group later referred to as the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) comprising Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone was set up by ECOWAS and charged with the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the sub-region.⁴ During the entire peace process spanning well over 14 years, Ghana played a leading role in trying to find a sustainable solution to the conflict. For example, under Ghana's former President Jerry Rawlings, several peace agreements were brokered in Ghana between 1994 and 1995.

Several questions arise concerning Ghana's role in managing these conflicts. Is it sufficient to conclude that the country is fully committed to its foreign policy objectives as well as the principles upon which ECOWAS security policies are based? Furthermore, to what extent can one say that Ghana has been consistent in the implementation of, for example, the *ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*, and the *Supplementary protocol on Democracy and Good Governance*? Has Ghana always played a positive role in West African politics? These questions are important because, on the one hand, Ghana has played a crucial role in the management of the conflicts referred to above, but on the other hand, the country has been careful in its response to certain conflicts such as the crisis which engulfed its neighbour, Togo, in 2005. What explains such possible inconsistencies?

The aim of this paper is to discuss and analyse the costs, benefits and level of Ghana's consistency in the promotion of regional security. This will be done by taking stock of what it

² Beginning with its participation in the peacekeeping operation in Liberia, Ghana has been involved in the missions in Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. It has also been involved in mediation missions in these countries as well as in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Togo.

³ The ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, signed on 29 May 1981, in which member states resolved to give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression (Chapter II, Article 3) was invoked as the basis for the legal intervention in Liberia. Since then, the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security has been signed in December 1999, and which has been the legal basis for intervention in a member state.

⁴ Decision A/DEC.9/5/90 Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee. Banjul, 30 May 1990.

costs Ghana in its efforts to contribute to managing and resolving intra-state conflicts in West Africa and also factors which motivate Ghana's engagement in different situations.

The paper will begin by briefly tracing Ghana's involvement in peace and security activities in Africa, with an emphasis on its interventions in intra-state conflicts under the aegis of ECOWAS. Here, specific focus will be on the post-1990 period when ECOWAS first intervened in Liberia. It will then discuss the context for Ghana's participation in ECOWAS peacekeeping and mediation missions and the outcomes of such interventions. The human costs of these missions will also be highlighted.

Legal Framework for intervention

Ghana's involvement in African regional peace and security can be traced to the 1950s when Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist vision encouraged other African states in their struggle for independence. Even though successive governments after Nkrumah did not supply funds to freedom fighters as he liberally did, all subsequent governments have pursued a policy of fostering cooperation among Africans through regional integration and supporting countries whose territorial integrity is threatened.⁵

To a large extent, Ghana's role in West African politics is influenced by its foreign policy objectives, which are based on the promotion of friendly relations and economic cooperation with other countries, good neighbourliness, and a commitment to maintaining international peace and security. One ground rule which guides the formulation and conduct of foreign policy, particularly in Ghana, is the notion that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy. Thus Ghana's involvement in (sub)regional security is based not only on concern for re-establishing security in the conflict affected country, but also the fact that these conflicts could potentially spill over into Ghana's territory and affect domestic developmental and security policies.

Ghana's role in promoting regional security remains integral part of its foreign policy but this has not been consistent. According to the Constitution of Ghana, "in its dealings with other nations, the Government shall (a) promote and protect the interests of Ghana; (b) seek the establishment of a just and equitable international economic order; (c) promote respect for international law, treaty obligations and settlement of international disputes by peaceful means; (d) adhere to the principles enshrined in or as the case may be, the aims and ideals of the UN Charter, the OAU Charter, the Commonwealth, the ECOWAS Treaty and any other organisation of which Ghana is a member."⁶

Even though Ghana does not have a defence policy, there are general principles and guidelines as well as institutions that guide and implement national security policies. These policies – such as participation in peacekeeping in a neighbouring country in conflict – centre on factors considered important to national well-being and the security of the country. These factors include, safeguarding the country's constitution and preserving her territorial integrity, contributing to the socio-economic development of the nation and effective management of the national resources, ensuring security in the West African sub-region and contributing to peace and stability in Africa and the wider world.⁷

⁵ E.M. Debrah, '*Lessons from Ghana's Foreign Policy Since Independence.*' Paper presented at a Workshop on 'Ghana's Foreign policy Options' organised by the Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana. 2002. p. 27

⁶ Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, The Directive Principles of State Policy. Chapter 6 Article 40.

⁷ Culled from the Vision and Mission Statement of the Ministry of Defence. www.ghana.gov.gh. Accessed on 29 May 2006.

Whereas the concern for regional security has been consistent irrespective of the regime in power, relations with immediate neighbours has not always been consistent. This has been dictated mainly by the regime in power, their ideologies and the relationships that were forged across the region prior to coming into power. The consistency or otherwise of this regional security policy lies in the fact that in certain situations, response of the state to crisis in some neighbouring countries has not been as readily forthcoming as in others. For example, while there was immediate outspoken condemnation of the coup d'état in Cote d'Ivoire in September 2002, an unconstitutional move by the Togolese Army to install Faure Gnassingbe as the President of Togo following the death of his father was met with cautious silence from the Ghana government. Relations with regional neighbours have also been influenced by national interests. Due to the fact that Ghana imports crude oil from Nigeria, for example, various governments have always sought to have good relations with Nigeria.

Ghana as an actor in ECOWAS Peacekeeping and Peace-making

Ghana contributed troops to the first ECOWAS peacekeeping mission in Liberia in August 1990.⁸ Ghana's participation in the mission, at a time when sub-regional intervention in intra-state conflicts had not been properly developed, had initially been motivated by national interest, but eventually led to stabilizing security in the Liberian crisis.

Ghana's decision to intervene began when Jerry Rawlings, then president of Ghana, received a message from the Ghana Embassy in Monrovia that the embassy had been surrounded for days by rebels and that staff were running out of food and water. One of the factors that compelled immediate action by Ghana was the fact that the rebels and soldiers were engaged in senseless killing in Monrovia. The urgency of the situation was highlighted by the killing in July 1990 of more than 600 people who had sought refuge in the Lutheran Church in Monrovia. They were trapped inside the church and then slaughtered by government soldiers. Survivors who had run to the United Methodist Church across the street were also hunted down and killed by the soldiers.⁹ With this in mind, Rawlings called a meeting at the Castle (seat of the government of Ghana) to discuss the possibility of rescuing Ghanaians in Monrovia.¹⁰ During the discussion, there was a suggestion to invite the participation of Nigeria to give the mission a more international outlook. In the views of Rawlings and his advisors, inviting Nigeria would elicit international approval.¹¹ Therefore, a delegation led by Lt. Gen. Arnold Quainoo, then General Officer Commanding the Ghana Armed Forces, was subsequently dispatched to Nigeria, where a decision was made to send an ECOWAS force to Liberia. The Ghanaian contingent later joined the Nigerians, who had earlier sent a token force to Liberia on an assessment mission, after which an agreement was reached to make Gen. Quainoo the Force Commander.¹²

Even though the intervention in Liberia was saddled with mistakes and allegations of abuses by peacekeepers,¹³ the efficiency and professionalism of the ECOWAS force have improved with

⁸ It is worth noting that in 1990, Ghana was under military rule; thus the decision-making process of sending troops to Liberia was solely at the discretion of the military leadership and their advisors.

⁹ www.thelutheran.org. Accessed on 15 August 2006. www.tlcafrica.com. Accessed on 15 August 2006.

¹⁰ Interview with Mr. Victor Gbeho, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Special Representative of the ECOWAS Chairman in Liberia. June 15 2006.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Interview with Mr. Victor Gbeho, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Special Representative of the ECOWAS Chairman in Liberia. June 15 2006.

¹³ It is estimated that ECOMOG officers, men and civilians, had children with many Liberian women, conservatively, about 30,000. Aboagye F. Op cit. p. 203.

each new mission. It was clear that the experiences gained from participation in UN missions around the world provided the basic guidelines for organizing the force and helped achieve some form of stability in Liberia. Since then, Ghana, together with other ECOWAS member states, has spearheaded missions in Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and again in Liberia during the second war, from 1999-2003.

During the first Liberia war, Ghana was a member of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) which brokered the first ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia that was signed by the three warring factions at the time. A number of Peace Agreements were brokered by former President Rawlings who was the ECOWAS Chairman in 1994.¹⁴ These had varying levels of success, not for lack of dedication on the part of the mediators, but primarily because of the intransigence of the warring factions. Nevertheless, the process continued until 1997, when Charles Taylor won elections and became President. Rather than seize the opportunity to build peace in the country, Taylor saw his victory as an opportunity to witch-hunt his enemies. It is alleged that he even masterminded the death of the former Speaker of the National Assembly Hon. Samuel Dokie.¹⁵ Consequently, many of his adversaries were forced into exile, especially into neighbouring Guinea, and this created the basis for the eruption of the second war.

The Second Liberia war began not long after the departure of ECOMOG from Liberia in 1998. Successive Peace Agreements between the President and the warring factions had limited success until a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was finally signed in June 2003 under the auspices of President Kufuor. To ensure the success of the peace process, there was a need to disarm and demobilize the rebel soldiers and government militias. This was not going to be possible with the continued presence of Charles Taylor in Liberia.¹⁶ ECOWAS mediators thus focused their attention on getting Charles Taylor out of Liberia.¹⁷ ECOWAS mediators had previously failed in their attempts to convince Charles Taylor to resign for peace to prevail in Liberia. While attending the ECOWAS sponsored peace talks in Accra, the Special Court for Sierra Leone announced that it had issued an arrest warrant for Charles Taylor. There were expectations, therefore, that Ghana would arrest and send him to the Special Court in Sierra Leone.¹⁸ The Ghana government did not arrest Taylor and he subsequently left Accra aboard an official Ghanaian aircraft. At the time, the primary concern of Ghana and all the ECOWAS mediators was to guarantee a ceasefire and secure peace in Liberia, therefore, the team of mediators led by Ghana's President Kufuor felt their work had been undermined by the Special Court.¹⁹ President Taylor resigned and was granted political asylum in Nigeria, after which Taylor's vice-president became acting president, who subsequently handed over to a Transitional Government which organized elections in which the first female African President was elected. The request of the Special Court was then granted when President Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson requested for Taylor to be extradited to Liberia for trial.

¹⁴ Some of these were the Akosombo Agreement, 12 September 1994; Accra Acceptance and Accession Agreement, 21 December 1994; Accra Agreement on the Clarification of the Akosombo Agreement 21 December 1994.

¹⁵ *The Perspective*, 'LURD's Position Statement at the Ouagadougou Conference.' Atlanta, July 2002.

¹⁶ Due to distrust for Taylor, the rebel factions refused to disarm as long as Charles Taylor was still President.

¹⁷ Interview by Ofeibia Quist-Arcton with President J.A. Kufuor, President of the Republic of Ghana and Chairman of ECOWAS, July 16, 2003. www.allafrica.com. Accessed on 7 July 2006

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Ibid

Benefits of Regional Security Involvement

In line with Ghana's commitment to promote regional security, the country has participated in several ECOWAS, AU and UN Peacekeeping missions in Africa.²⁰ While the motive for this involvement has been to ensure peace and security of all countries in the region there have been other benefits to the country and some of its citizens over the years. Before a state participates in a peacekeeping mission, a decision is made either at the (sub)regional (ECOWAS, AU) or the international (UN) level to send troops to a conflict area. When the request is sent through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the MOD advises government on the capability of the country's Armed Forces to deploy. Due to Ghana's commitment to international protocols, it is always ready to assist in any way possible so far as it does not compromise on the country's national security. Before committing troops to international peacekeeping, an internal threat assessment is done to ensure that the absence of the troops on the ground will not affect national security. As recent African conflicts have been intra-state, the Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service conduct their own assessment on whether the absence of the forces will have an adverse effect on the country, in terms of quelling any internal conflict and preventing any major national security crisis. Once this assessment has been done, the process of selecting and training the forces for their peacekeeping or enforcement duties in the war affected country begins.

The main beneficiaries of Ghana's regional security involvement have been the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service whose officers participate in peace missions. Peacekeeping has also brought direct benefit to Ghana as funds from the peacekeeping account are used for national projects.²¹ Other benefits of Ghana's involvement in (sub)regional security are discussed below.

Training assistance for peace enforcement officers

Due to Ghana's continued participation in peacekeeping, the country has benefited from such programmes as the African Crisis Response Initiative²² (ACRI) and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) from the United States State Department as part of its support to African peacekeeping. Under the African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), a programme of the United Kingdom Government, Ghana has received military assistance.

Under President Bush's first and second administration, the ACRI was transformed into the new programme called the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance, which provides military trainers and equips African national militaries to conduct peace support operations and humanitarian relief. The programme's goal is to increase the capabilities of these militaries in areas such as human rights, interaction with civil society, international humanitarian law, military staff skills and small unit operations.²³ The criteria for selecting a beneficiary country of ACOTA

²⁰ ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone, UNMIL and UNAMSIL in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively, AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), UNAMIR in Rwanda, etc.

²¹ This research was unable to establish the size of this peacekeeping account. However, money from this account was used to purchase a presidential Gulf Stream Jet, which was subsequently sold in order to purchase four Helicopters for the Ghana Armed Forces. www.bbc.co.uk. Accessed on 12 June 2006.

²² From July 1997 through 2001, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) conducted battalion initial training in Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Benin.

²³ Since 1996, over 8600 African troops from the ACRI/ACOTA beneficiaries have received training through the ACRI programmes. In 2001, ACRI received \$15.6 million in funding; during 2002, ACRI received an estimated \$15 million and for 2003, it was estimated that the ACOTA would need \$10million in funding. See Daniel Volman, 'US Military Programs in sub-Saharan Africa, 2001-2003. February 2003. In 2005, the US put about \$29 million into the ACOTA programme, and in 2007, the investment is expected to rise to \$48 million. To date, ACOTA has provided

are that the country should be a proponent of good governance and democracy; and be consistently engaged in peacekeeping activities.²⁴

The training, which is done at Bundase in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana, offers military peacekeepers more practical training and thus brings the military peacekeeper up to standard with international best practices on peacekeeping. Previous training in the armed forces was on conventional warfare; attacking and defending, however, the training has prepared the peacekeeper in the protection of civilians, and given the armed forces training in internal defence. The ACRI/ACOTA training has been particularly beneficial to the Ghana Armed Forces as the training of troops is an expensive venture requiring the provision of weapons, vehicles, fuel, food and uniforms. The training has enabled members of the Armed Forces to constantly improve their skills. Without such training programmes, little attention would have been given to the continuous training of the armed forces in order to make them combat ready.²⁵

Similar training assistance has been provided by countries such as France and Canada through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities Programme (RECAMP) and the Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP) respectively.

The Ghana Police Service, however, has received little support (in comparison to that of the military) to train its officers who go on peace missions. The Ghana Police International Relations Unit coordinates the assembling and the training of police officers. Since 1989, when police officers were deployed to Kuwait, Namibia and then Cambodia, Ghanaian Police officers have been deployed to other countries such as Cote D'Ivoire, DR Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Kosovo, East Timor and Sudan. In countries where the security sector has totally collapsed, the police officers take charge of the maintenance of law and order.

In spite of the challenge of inadequate training for peace support operations, law enforcement officers benefit from their involvement in the mission areas. Apart from the enhanced quality of lifestyle that deployment to the mission brings to the officers and their families in terms of improved financial benefits, they attain a broader perspective on policing issues and gain expertise in other areas such as human rights, different policing methods, and raise the image of Ghanaian police officers.²⁶ Deployment to peacekeeping missions has broadened the outlook of the military and police peacekeepers as well as helped them to acquire knowledge on different types of equipment due to the multi-faceted and multi-national nature of peace support operations.

training and non-lethal equipment such as uniforms, mine detectors and water purification equipment to over 26,000 peacekeepers from 13 African countries, including Ghana. See also Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. *Your Role in Africa's Evolving Security Challenges: The Next Generation of African Military Leaders Program.* Remarks to the African Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University. 10 January 2006. <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2006/60386.htm>. Accessed on 14 June 2006

²⁴ US interests in Ghana remain democracy, human rights and humanitarian concerns, particularly HIV/AIDS, and regional security. In Fiscal year 2007, the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) of the US Department of State, will support strategic interest in regional stability, counter-terrorism, democracy and health, and expand the peacekeeping roles of the Ghana military in the region. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme will continue to enhance the professional, technical and tactical proficiency of the Ghana Armed Forces through US professional military education courses. US Department of State, Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, Washington DC. <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/64666.htm>. Accessed on 14 June 2006.

²⁵ Interview with Senior Officer of the Ghana Armed Forces. June 2006, Accra.

²⁶ SG/SM/9130 PKO/102 'Secretary General Praises Ghana's "Steadfast", 40-Year Commitment to UN Peacekeeping, in Message to Inauguration of Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. Accra. 28 January 2004. <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2004/sgsm9130.html>. Accessed on 15 June 2006.

The lack of proper and long-term planning to Ghana’s promotion of regional security in terms of deployment on peace support operations has resulted in situations where training for security forces is not coordinated at the national level, with the involvement of all stakeholders in the security sector in Ghana. It is important that officers who embark on peace missions are trained on the peculiar nature of conflict societies, as most of these officers are from relatively stable societies, while the mission areas and countries have peculiarities as a result of the armed conflict and would therefore require special training in order for the police to respond appropriately to situations.

Reimbursement for equipment and personnel

With Ghana’s regular participation in peacekeeping missions, the country has been ‘compelled’ to upgrade its military equipment and acquire other equipment that are more appropriate for peacekeeping. The UN General Assembly by Resolution 50/222 of 11 April 1996 authorized the implementation of a new reimbursement system which was designed to encourage Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) to provide equipment to their troops in the peacekeeping mission. Under this new arrangement, the Wet and Dry Lease reimbursement systems were introduced. The Wet Lease is where the TCC provides and assumes responsibility for the maintenance and support for deployed major equipment.²⁷ Dry Lease means the TCC provides the major equipment and the UN assumes responsibility for the maintenance of the equipment. Self-sustainment is a logistic support concept for contingents in the UN peacekeeping mission whereby the TCC provides some specific or all logistics support to the contingent on a reimbursable basis. Self-sustainment covers areas such as medical, tentage, laundry and cleaning, communication, catering, accommodation and electrical among others.²⁸ The reimbursement rate for personnel with effect from 1 January 2002 is as presented in the table below.²⁹

Table 1: Rates of reimbursement of contingents.³⁰

Reimbursement Item	Contingent per Month (\$)
Troops costs	1,028
Personnel clothing, gear and equipment allowance	63.00
Personal weaponry and training ammunition	5.00
Allowance for specialist	303.00

The contingent personnel also receive directly from the peacekeeping mission a daily allowance of \$1.28 plus a recreational leave allowance of \$73.50 for six months duty tour.

The Government is therefore reimbursed for the ordinary contingent member with an amount of \$1096 per month while for the specialist an amount of \$1399 per month is reimbursed.³¹ Considering that the ordinary contingent member is paid \$20 a day (making \$600 a month for 30 days), while provision is made for catering and some of the other provisions under self-sustainment (not readily quantifiable), the country makes significant *profits* on each ordinary contingent member and specialist that it deploys on a UN mission.

²⁷ Lt. Gen. Seth Obeng, former Chief of Defence Staff of the Ghana Armed Forces, Presentation on Ghana’s participation in Global and Regional Peacekeeping Operation to Mr. Roger Moran, Deputy Director for Peacekeeping, United States Department of State, 18 October 2003, Burma Camp.

²⁸ Ibid. Interview with the Director of Army Peacekeeping Operations, Ghana Armed Forces.

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Ibid

The Wet Lease system of reimbursement is especially beneficial to developing countries such as Ghana, which have very obsolete military equipment. The same amount is paid for the equipment, irrespective of its age, so far as it functions properly. For example, for an Armoured Personnel Carrier – wheeled (infantry carrier – armed), the UN pays the TCC an amount of \$5542 per month under the Wet Lease system and \$2310 under the Dry Lease system.³² It is therefore expected that the longer the mission lasts, the *better* it becomes for the TCC to benefit more from the operation. Participation in peacekeeping missions and the potential benefit therein have compelled the government to better equip its forces. The state stands to benefit more from this system if it is able to purchase and use such equipment in its missions. In any case, the equipment reverts back to the TCC at the end of the mission. Ghana has, however, not had any significant advantage from the supply of equipment as it is unable to purchase and deploy significant quantities of equipment in order to accrue sufficient benefit from the reimbursement of equipment.

Costs of Regional Security Involvement

Costs which the country has borne have included the many peacemaking initiatives which successive governments have hosted. These include hosting a number of rebel groups and their representatives, especially in the Liberian conflict where at least five such talks took place in Ghana. Hosting peace talks requires providing accommodation and maintenance for all the groups involved for as long as the talks last. Peacemaking also requires sending Ghanaian representatives to negotiate with belligerents alongside other mediators in the region. Costs for travel, accommodation and sustenance allowances are all borne by the Ghana government.

As indicated above, UN missions are supported mainly by the UN Security Council which allocates funds to individual missions. The situation is slightly different when it is primarily an ECOWAS mission where member states are expected to self-finance the first three months of the mission to be reimbursed by ECOWAS within a maximum of six months.³³ In the first ECOMOG operation in Liberia, the government of Ghana sponsored its own contingent to Liberia and paid for the troops. There was some assistance from Nigeria in the form of fuel supplies and other logistics, but basically, there were no reimbursements.³⁴ Based on bilateral agreements with some developed countries, there was some external support. For example, some of the Ghanaian battalions in Liberia were sponsored by the US which provided assistance in the form of equipment. Again, in the first ECOWAS mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI), the Ghanaian contingent was sponsored by France. With the recent trend in peacekeeping in which the regional forces are deployed with the assurance of the UN taking over the mission at a later date, it has become relatively easier for developing countries to commit resources and personnel to the war affected areas to be reimbursed by the UN at a later date.

There have been arguments at the local level as to whether Ghana should send as many troops and police officers on peacekeeping and enforcement missions when the region is relatively unstable and when locally, there has been an increase in armed robbery and other violent crimes. Much as the argument has always been for keeping the troops and the police officers on the

³² Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning Reimbursement and Control of Contingent Owned Equipment of Troop Contributing Countries Participating in Peacekeeping Mission. Drafted by the Department of Peacekeeping Operation – Field Administration and Logistics Division.

³³ Chapter VII, Article 37, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, ECOWAS 1999.

³⁴ Nigeria claimed to have spent some \$2-3 billion on the operations. It is estimated that Ghana spent in excess of \$25million on troop maintenance and operations, excluding the bills for equipment, the sea and airlift of contingents, and other diplomatic activities. Festus Aboagye, Op Cit. p.290, 31

ground to protect the territorial integrity of the country, Ghana also has other international responsibilities as it is signatory to accords and treaties which compel it to contribute to regional peace and security. In any case, before the Ghana Armed Forces is deployed on a peacekeeping mission, an internal threat assessment is conducted to ensure that the condition in the country is stable enough for the number of personnel on the ground to contain any emergency. Such potential threat analysis focuses on the political climate in the country, the ethnic relations and potential ethnic tensions; and the ability of the Police and the personnel remaining to contain any minimum emergency that might arise.

As at May 2007, Ghana had a total of 3,351 officers of the Ghana Armed Forces and Police Service on external operations in Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Western Sahara, Burundi and Sudan. Majority of the missions are based in African countries. Ghana is participating in 8 UN missions in Africa and one in the Middle East. In addition, the Ghana Police Service is involved in other missions in Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, DR Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Kosovo and East Timor.

In terms of casualties and deaths of Ghanaians in the mission area, it has been less than one percent. Since the mission in Congo, a total of 178 Ghanaian officers have lost their lives in peacekeeping.³⁵

In terms of health implications of continued participation in peacekeeping, the West Africa Health Organisation reckons that the situation could well be similar to that of Southern Africa, where HIV prevalence rates in the military is between three and five times higher than that of the general population. However in the Ghana Armed Forces, the prevalence of HIV is lower than that in the general population of Ghana which currently stands at 3.8%.³⁶ The practice in the Ghana Armed Forces has been that all personnel earmarked for peacekeeping are tested for HIV. Soldiers who are found to be HIV positive miss out on the extra income they make from the peacekeeping missions and therefore make active efforts to prevent themselves from being infected.³⁷

Consistency of Ghana's commitment to regional security and peace

While Ghana has been engaged in (sub)regional security through peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding processes, this section will assess the consistency or otherwise of this commitment. The country has been very active in trying to find a solution to the Ivorian conflict which erupted in 2002 and has hosted a number of peace talks.³⁸ Unfortunately, while Ghana has been engaged in peacemaking efforts in Côte d'Ivoire, its territory has sometimes been used as a recruitment ground for (sub)regional soldiers of fortune. This was certainly the case with the Liberian refugee camp in the Gomoa district of Ghana, about which it has been reported that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire was recruiting its fighters.³⁹ In another report by the International Crisis Group, it is stated that "in January 2003, as many as 500 Liberian refugees in Ghana were

³⁵ This includes the 45 that were massacred in Port Franqui on 28 April 1961 in the Congo, 89 on UN peacekeeping operations and 32 on ECOWAS operation. Since 2003, there has been one death each in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. Since 1989, 10 Police officers have lost their lives in the mission. cit. Lt. Gen. Seth Obeng. See also Lt. Col. Festus Aboagye, *The Ghana Army, A Concise Contemporary Guide to Its Centennial Regimental History 1897 – 1999*. Sedco Publishing, 1999. pp 384-397. Interview with the Director of Army Peacekeeping Operations, Burma Camp. June 2006. Accra.

³⁶ Brigadier General Daniel Twum, Director of Medical Service of the Ghana Armed Forces. Irin News. February 9 2004. www.irinnews.org. Accessed on 14 June 2006.

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Such as the Accra I, II and III Peace Talks.

³⁹ A.C. Ohene, "Swoop on Buduburam", *Ghanaian Chronicle*, 24 February 2003.

alleged to have been offered money and taken to a training base by LURD recruiters.”⁴⁰ The government reacted to this by sending troops to the camp to search the homes of refugees.⁴¹

On the democratic front, Ghana has become increasingly vocal in its support for democratic principles in the region. As was succinctly reported by the Democracy Coalition Project “Ghana’s record of support for democracy abroad in the last ten years has shifted from fair to good as the country itself has undergone a transition to democratic rule within this same period.”⁴² The report further highlighted ex-president Rawlings’ disinclination to condemn other military dictatorships as he was the leader of the coup that deposed the democratically elected leader of Ghana in 1981.⁴³

To a large extent, while the Directive Principles of State Policy in the constitution of Ghana has allowed for continuity in foreign policy formulation, other determinants of foreign policy have influenced the way in which Ghana promotes regional security. These determinants include the nature and policies of the regime in power. With regard to the level of diplomatic relations with neighbours, it is greatly influenced by regime change. This has, in turn, affected some of the security decisions that Ghana has taken since independence.

Table 2: Regime changes and foreign policy consistency in Ghana.

Year	Name of Regime	Type of Regime	Level of Foreign policy consistency
1957- 1966	Convention People’s Party (CPP)	One-party democracy	Pan-Africanist/strongly consistent
1966-1969	National Liberation Council	Military	Pro-US
1969-1972	The Progress Party	Democracy	Pro-US
1972-1978	Supreme Military Council	Military	Support for African regional communities/consistent
1979-1981	People National Party	Democracy	Support for African regional communities/consistent
1981-1992	Provisional National Defence Council	Military	Support for non-aligned movement/consistent
1993-2000	National Democratic Congress	Democracy	Support for regional security/consistent
2001-2007	New Patriotic Party	Democracy	Support for regional security/strongly consistent

For example, relations between former president Rawlings and the late President Eyadema of Togo were stale. This was translated into how Ghana reacted to the influx of Togolese refugees into the country in 1993 when there were violent clashes in Togo, following a crackdown by government security forces on the opposition. There was an influx of about 135,000 Togolese

⁴⁰ International Crisis Group, Cote d’Ivoire; *The War is Not Yet Over*, Africa Report no. 72. November 2003. Ghanaian President Kufuor reportedly intervened to end the recruitment.

⁴¹ Op cit.

⁴² Democracy Coalition Project, *Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002*. www.demcoalition.org. Accessed on 29 June 2006.

⁴³ Ex-President Rawlings also led a coup in 1979 in which senior military officers were killed. Indeed it was Rawlings’ revolutionary ideas which became a source of suspicion between him and the late Eyadema, as the latter perceived Rawlings as a bad influence on the politics of West Africa and Togo especially. Rawlings’ support of Gilcrest Olympio, an opposition leader in Togo and a sworn enemy of the Togolese President led to heightened tensions between the two countries.

refugees into Ghana, many of whom joined their families along the border towns.⁴⁴ The Ghana government set up a refugee camp at Klikor situated about 15km from the Togo border. Government at the time was very eager to grant refugee status to the Togolese due to the political dissatisfaction that existed between the two governments. It appeared content to use the Togolese refugees as evidence that the Togolese government did not respect the human rights of its citizens and a possible basis for its removal.⁴⁵

Apart from the Togolese refugees, Ghana has also hosted Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees. A National Refugee Law was passed in 1992 which paved the way for Ghana to host over 50,000 refugees from the two countries.⁴⁶ However, this has not been without challenges as the refugees have sometimes complained of indifference from the Ghana government. The government has on the other hand been torn between the wishes of its citizens and its international obligations.

The issue of personal ties being a major determinant of foreign/regional security engagement was again demonstrated when Kufuor became President of Ghana. Whereas the relationship between Rawlings and Eyadema had been tense, relations between Kufuor in opposition and Eyadema were good.⁴⁷ Within seven days of his inauguration as President, he paid working visits to Togo and Burkina Faso.⁴⁸ This could aptly be described as choosing domestic strategic interest over the promotion of democracy abroad, as Eyadema's presidency had been anything but democratic. Under Eyadema's regime, human rights of ordinary Togolese were abused and the President used his control over the security forces to undermine multiparty elections. This eventually led to economic sanctions against Togo by the European Union.⁴⁹

While seeking "peaceful co-existence and close co-operation with all its neighbours, especially in the West African sub-region," regime interest seems to override national interest or regional security interest for that matter. This was emphasized when after the death of Eyadema, the military installed his son as president, against the constitution of Togo which stipulated that the president of the National Assembly was to become President upon the untimely death of the sitting President. While ECOWAS and its leaders condemned the undemocratic actions in Togo, Ghanaian officials were silent on the matter. It took repeated pressure from the media and other civil society organizations in Ghana to prompt the Ghana government to issue a statement on the situation in Togo. This sharply contrasts the case of Cote d'Ivoire, where immediately following the coup in September 2002, the Ghana government issued a statement condemning the coup and its perpetrators and called for the immediate return to constitutional rule. Clearly,

⁴⁴ United Nations System, Standing Committee on Nutrition, 'Nutritional Information in Crisis Situations – Benin, Ghana and Togo region. RNIS 3, February 1994.

⁴⁵ Abeeku Essuman-Johnson, 'Ghana's Policy Towards Refugees Since Independence.' *Ghana Social Science Journal (New Series)*. Vol. 2, No. 1. May 2003. pp. 154-155.

⁴⁶ Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) LAW 305 D 1992.

⁴⁷ There are unconfirmed reports that Eyadema sponsored Kufuor's election campaign. It has also been alleged that the high votes that Rawlings's National Democratic Congress (NDC) continued to gain in the Volta region, situated along the Eastern border of Ghana, was as a result of the high numbers of Togolese crossing the border on Election Day to vote for the NDC. Thus on election day in December 2000, the Togolese border was closed by Eyadema to prevent Togolese from crossing, thus paving the way for the NDC to receive fewer votes. This helped the then opposition candidate Kufuor to win the presidential election.

⁴⁸ Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, 'Ghana election 2000; Implications and Significance for the Future,' *African Security Review* Vol. 10 No.2, 2001. In the article, Kwesi Aning states that 'six days after his inauguration as president, before cabinet had even been formed, Kufuor accepted an invitation from the Togolese leader, the late Gnassingbe Eyadema, to pay a state visit on 13 January and participate in celebrations of the 34th anniversary of the overthrow of the previous government.'

⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch, 'Protectors or Pretenders, Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa, Togo.' 2001. <http://hrw.org/reports/2001/africa/togo.html>. Accessed on 29 June 2006

where strategic economic and personal interests are at stake, Ghana's leaders have chosen cooperation and friendship with entrenched dictators over criticism.⁵⁰

The Way Forward for Ghana

The discussion above has highlighted the fact that the inconsistencies in Ghana's promotion of regional security have been due to the fact that the country does not have a well-articulated defence and national security policy. The closest that comes to a national security document is a domestic security legislation, an Act of Parliament titled, the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act 526, passed in Parliament in 1996. The 'Act makes provision in respect of a National Security Council; to provide for the establishment of the Regional and District Security Councils, to specify some of the state agencies responsible for implementing government policies on security of the state and attendant issues on or relating to the internal and external security of Ghana, and to provide for related matters.'⁵¹ The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act (ACT 526) simply enumerates the various offices and functions of the national security agencies; but fails to articulate the policies which are to be upheld and implemented by these offices.

The main document that enumerates Ghana's foreign policy is the 1992 Constitution. The provisions of Articles 40, 41, 73 and 81 of the Constitution as well as the guiding Principles of State Policy enshrined in the Constitution determine certain courses of action to be taken. These include the promotion and protection of Ghana's interest abroad, the protection of Ghanaian citizens, protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ghana, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, respect for international law and treaty obligations, promoting the establishment of a just and equitable international economic and social order and adherence to the principles and charter obligations of international organisations to which Ghana belongs such as the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).⁵² This constitutional provision has ensured some level of continuity in the formulation and implementation of Ghana's foreign policy.

The absence of a well-defined and articulated defence policy document has sometimes resulted in *ad hoc* response to crisis such as those in Togo and Cote d'Ivoire. It is not enough to have general principles and guidelines as well as institutions that guide and implement defence policies. Attempts have been made in the past to reform the defence sector and subsequently draw up a national defence policy. The Ministry of Defence, seeing the need for reform and the adoption of a defence policy, launched a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) with the assistance of the UK Defence Advisory team.⁵³ Since 2003, when the first phase of the PIP was commenced, there has not been any significant development. Similarly, reforms have been envisioned to support the already defined role of the Police in crime prevention and ensuring peace, stability and security in the country. Through the Police Improvement Team (PIT), the agent to lead the reform process, the reform project seeks to develop appropriate institutional capacities to improve service delivery, public accountability and creditability, and improve the

⁵⁰ Democracy Coalition Project, *Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002*. www.demcoalition.org. Accessed on 29 June 2006

⁵¹ ACT 526, Security and Intelligence Services Act. 1996.

⁵² 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana. See also Hon. Hackman Owusu-Agyeman, 'Ghana's Foreign Policy under the Kufuor Administration', Paper presented at a Workshop on 'Ghana's Foreign policy Options' organised by the Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana. 2002.

⁵³ See 'Security Sector Reform in Ghana', Inventory of security sector reform (SSR) efforts in partner countries of German development assistance. www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz. Accessed on 30 June 2006

overall governance and operations of the police (especially in the area of human rights and community policing).⁵⁴ This project has also experienced a significant lull since 2003.

There is, however, a need to produce a comprehensive security document which will take into account the defence, national security and foreign policies of Ghana. A defence and national security policy is imperative as Ghana increasingly seeks to involve itself in finding solutions to crisis in the region. The (sub)regional security policy, therefore, would include aspects of the national security, defence and foreign policies of the country. Once such a policy is in place, it will guide the decisions and actions of future governments in their interactions within the region. This should begin with Parliament taking a more proactive role in defence and security decisions. Parliament will need to establish an independent commission to oversee the formulation of such a policy, to include stakeholders such as the Ghana Armed Forces, Police Service, Interior and Foreign Affairs Ministries, Academic institutions and civil society.

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations have played a more prominent role in resolving the conflicts that afflict their specific (sub)regions. This has come to be expected; and while ECOWAS will take the lead in attempting to resolve a conflict that afflicts one of its members; the African Union takes over when ECOWAS faces difficulties in financing such missions. Subsequently, the UN becomes involved when the conflict persists without any solution in sight. These have been both at the diplomatic/mediation level and at the peacekeeping level. This is based on the premise that the regional organizations due to their proximity to the country in conflict will share similar cultures, language and a common understanding and also be motivated by the need to prevent the conflict from spilling over into neighbouring countries to intervene in whatever form. However, the above analysis shows that “while a troop contributing country may share language, cultural elements and a common understanding with the host country, it may also have its own agenda, independent of the peacekeeping agenda. There is a need to watch this possibility carefully, given the goal of long-term regional peace and security.”⁵⁵

Governments are vocal about their commitment to (sub)regional bodies being the deciding factor in their participation in regional peace initiatives. However, association with the intervening (sub)regional body is not a compelling enough reason to participate. Apart from the humanitarian reasons for Ghana’s intervention in Liberia, peacekeeping was also used to keep the stray elements (who were noted for their abuses against members of the armed forces and civilians) of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)⁵⁶ revolution in check and occupied with activities. It was expected that upon their return from the mission, they would properly re-integrate into society.⁵⁷ It was therefore, least surprising that there were allegations of abuse against some of the ECOMOG troops in Liberia. It is thus always important to have an international and more ‘neutral’ hand to resolve conflicts. The need for (sub)regional intervention is still very relevant as mobilization becomes faster, while waiting for the necessary financial backing from the international level.

The ECOWAS Standby force development is predicated on the defining of the operational requirements through detailed needs analysis, examination of military capabilities and assets of member states, determination of existing shortfalls in capability and creation of strategic and

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ US Mission to the UN, Press Release 134 (04), July 20 2004. www.un.int/usa. Accessed on 29 June 2006.

⁵⁶ The PNDC ruled Ghana from 31 December 1981 to December 1992.

⁵⁷ Interview with Senior Officer of the Ghana Armed Forces, 22 June 2006.

tactical policies, processes, procedures and other working support of the force development.⁵⁸ From the case of Ghana above, does ECOWAS stand to lose or gain by depending on the political inconsistencies of contributing states towards its standby unit? As has been discussed in this paper, several factors go into a state's decision to intervene militarily or politically in crisis affecting another member state. These factors are crucial to helping ECOWAS understand what to expect from its member states in terms of commitment to agreed protocols and decisions. National politics, idiosyncrasies and personal/regime ties are major deciding factors in a state's regional security engagement. It is not expected that there will be equal commitment from all member states towards this initiative; and even if such commitment is made, making good those promises will depend on the factors enumerated above.

The need for Ghana to have a comprehensive defence and national security policy cannot be over-emphasized. This will dictate the number of troops and police personnel that it will send on peacekeeping operations. It will also ensure that there are enough personnel on the ground to take care of any emergency that might occur. A well-documented defence and national security policy will meet the training needs of all personnel on peace support operations. It will also guarantee effective legislative oversight over the security sector and ensure that decisions on (sub)regional security are not based on personal/regime relationships.

⁵⁸ Col. Dixon Dikio, 'ECOWAS Standby Units; Proposed Concept and Structures', Abuja, 19 May 2004. p.5



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