The 2012 security situation in Mali has evolved over the years in terms of frequency, lethality, complexity and in recent developments geographical location. Security analysts have warned of an increase in terrorist expansion from the Sahel to coastal states in West Africa. Since the March 2016 Jihadi attack in Burkina Faso, acts of violent extremism and terrorism (VET) has become consistent and trans-national. As a result, hints of violent extremist attacks have been reported south of known operational zones i.e. the Sahel belt. In 2021, about 58% of the reported 70% of violent attacks by extremist and terrorist groups were recorded in Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso serves as an entry point for VET groups to the coast as it borders Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo. These countries have a shared weakness which are capitalized on by violent extremist groups. Such weaknesses include porous borders, relatively weak government and security institutions, organized criminal syndicates, demographic challenges, unemployment, youth bulge and local grievances. As a result, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo have recorded an increase in violent attacks. These attacks are alleged to be perpetrated by the Macina Liberation Front (FLM), stemming from the Jama’ at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). Violent extremist groups use weapons from looted military barracks in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and stockpile leakages from mines for their activities. This calls for urgent interventions to improve stockpile management and reduce the proliferation of terrorism and violent extremism to the littoral states of West Africa and also, reduce diversions and trafficking of weapons from government stockpiles. The consistent occurrences of violent attacks expose the vulnerabilities of counter initiatives including the recent joint initiative by Ghana, Burkina Faso, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo – Accra Initiative.
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